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Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is anything approximating the
creative self-authorship of personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant. After consider-
ing the possibility that Kantian prudential reasoning might serve as a conception of personal
autonomy, I argue that the elements of a more suitable conception can be found in Kant’s
Tugendlehre, or “Doctrine of Virtue”—specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and
the practical love of others. This discovery is important for at least three reasons: first, it eluci-
dates the relationship among the various conceptions of autonomy employed by personal-auton-
omy theorists and contemporary Kantians; second, it brings to the surface previously unnoticed
or undernoticed features of Kant’s moral theory; and third, it provides an essential line of
defense against certain critiques of contemporary Kantian theories, especially that of John
Rawls.
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The contemporary ideal of personal autonomy is one that celebrates cre-
ative self-authorship and encourages the development of those virtues (such
as integrity and authenticity) that support it. It has its roots in the Romantic
liberalism of John Stuart Mill, who argued for a multiplicity of “experiments
in living” for the sake of the “free development of individuality.”1 Simulta-
neously, however, it emphasizes the need for self-control to ensure that
lower-order desires do not usurp the authority of the higher-order ones that
define our character and determine the shape and direction of our lives. In
sum, it weds the freewheeling creativity of the bohemian to the disciplined
management of the bourgeois.
602
AUTHOR’S NOTE: I wish to thank Robert Adcock, Yvonne Chiu, Meir Dan-Cohen, Brad
Inwood, Chris Kutz, David Lieberman, Eric Rakowski, Connie Rosati, Sam Scheffler, Lael
Weis, Allen Wood, and the other participants in workshops at Stanford and the University of
California–Berkeley for their helpful comments. I am especially grateful to John Christman for
his many excellent written suggestions; the essay is much improved because of them.
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 33 No. 5, October 2005 602-628
DOI: 10.1177/0090591705278397
© 2005 Sage Publications
Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is any-
thing approximating personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant.2
Although Waldron ultimately concludes that Kant has at most a prototheory
of personal autonomy, even so cautious a judgment would be considered con-
troversial by both personal-autonomy theorists and contemporary Kantians.
These two groups believe they use very different, even incompatible concep-
tions of autonomy and are deeply suspicious of the idea that these concep-
tions may be connected in fundamental ways. For example, Joseph Raz, a
personal-autonomy theorist, warns that “personal autonomy should not be
confused with the only very indirectly related notion of moral autonomy”
and that Kantian moral autonomy in particular reduces “[self-]authorship to a
vanishing point as it allows only one set of principles which people can ratio-
nally legislate and they are the same for all.”3 Similarly, Onora O’Neill, a con-
temporary Kantian, thinks that Kant and personal-autonomy theorists have
“radically differing conceptions of action and autonomy” and makes the
case for “disentangling Kant’s conception of autonomy from contemporary
ones.”4 In this essay, I intend to further entangle these two conceptions—and
perhaps initiate a process of reconciliation between these two groups of
theorists—by arguing for a specifically Kantian personal autonomy.
A conception of personal autonomy could be Kantian in at least two dif-
ferent senses, though. First, it could be Kantian in the simple sense that it is
present in Kant’s writings. I will contend, for example, that Kant’s idea of
prudential reasoning is a conception of personal autonomy that would (or
should) be recognized as such by contemporary personal-autonomy theo-
rists. Second, it could be Kantian in the arguably deeper sense that Kant him-
self would recognize it as a species of autonomy. I will argue that prudential
reasoning is not Kantian in this second sense but that one can find the ele-
ments of such a conception in Kant’s Tugendlehre, or “Doctrine of Virtue”—
to wit, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of oth-
ers. Only this second, more authentic version of Kantian personal autonomy
can call into question the sharp contrast between personal and moral auton-
omy drawn by personal-autonomy theorists and contemporary Kantians
alike and lay the groundwork for a resolution of their disagreement(s).
Locating twentieth-century concepts in the writings of eighteenth-cen-
tury thinkers will strike some readers as a peculiar pastime if not a hopelessly
anachronistic one, but I think this exercise has great value for at least three
different reasons. First, it elucidates the relationship among the various con-
ceptions of autonomy employed by personal-autonomy theorists and con-
temporary Kantians. As Gerald Dworkin notes, we face “one concept and
many conceptions of autonomy,” with disagreement even among personal-
autonomy theorists as to its meaning.5 By exploring the question of whether
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Kant had a conception of personal autonomy, we can learn much about the
way these conceptions are (or are not) connected, thereby making some ini-
tial progress toward a unified theory of autonomy.6
Second, we can discover a great deal about Kant’s own moral theory by
confronting it with contemporary concepts and concerns. In the present case,
by examining both the similarities and differences between personal auton-
omy and certain Kantian concepts (e.g., prudential reasoning and imperfect
duties of virtue), we can bring to the surface previously unnoticed or
undernoticed features of his theory (e.g., his concern for self-authorship).
The danger, of course, is in reading concepts back into his theory that are in
fact rather alien to it, but I think this danger is more than compensated for by
the fresh insights that can potentially be gained by making the comparisons;
moreover, this danger can be mitigated by a cautious and sensitive reading of
the primary text.
Finally, the second, preferred version of Kantian personal autonomy
offers an essential line of defense against certain critiques of contempo-
rary Kantian theories, especially that of John Rawls. Jeremy Waldron and
Michael Sandel, for example, have made two criticisms of Rawlsian agency
(what I will call the “Discontinuity” and “Arbitrariness” criticisms, respec-
tively), criticisms that can be deflected by Rawls’s adoption of Kantian per-
sonal autonomy or of something close to it. Whether such an adoption can
take place after his so-called “political turn” is another question entirely, to be
considered below.
The remainder of my essay will be organized as follows. First, I will offer
a very brief review of the literature of personal autonomy in order to orient
the unfamiliar reader. Next, following a path partially blazed by Waldron, I
will examine the remarkable similarities between personal autonomy and
Kant’s idea of prudential reasoning. Then, after arguing that Kant himself
would not consider prudential reasoning to be a species of autonomy, I will
discover the elements of a more suitable conception of personal autonomy in
Kant’s imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of others.
Finally, I will show how such a conception, if adopted by Rawls, can provide
an effective line of defense against the criticisms mentioned above—though
only at the perhaps modest cost of returning to the comprehensive Kantian
liberalism of Theory.
PERSONAL AUTONOMY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Both Joseph Raz and John Rawls provide good general descriptions of
personal autonomy in their respective writings. According to Raz:
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The ideal of personal autonomy . . . holds the free choice of goals and relations as an
essential ingredient of individual well-being. The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal
autonomy is that people should make their own lives. The autonomous person is (part)
author of his own life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling,
to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout
their lives.7
Raz associates this ideal of self-authorship or self-creation with certain auxil-
iary virtues, such as self-awareness and integrity, and contrasts it with self-
realization and other substantive ideals.8 On Raz’s understanding, what
makes a person autonomous is not the specific content of his “goals and rela-
tions” but rather the manner in which he evaluates, adopts, and pursues them.
Rawls develops his own conception of personal autonomy (which he
refers to as “rational autonomy”), one which places greater emphasis on its
planning and deliberative features. He associates this kind of autonomy with
Kantian empirical practical reason, saying at one point that it “roughly paral-
lels Kant’s notion of hypothetical imperatives.”9 Rather than focusing on the
creative side of personal autonomy, Rawls highlights its dependence on prin-
ciples of rational choice, such as “the adoption of effective means to ends; the
balancing of final ends by their significance in our plan of life as a whole; and
finally, the assigning of a greater weight to the more likely consequences.”10
For Rawls, personal autonomy is firmly wedded to deliberative rationality; as
with Raz, though, the focus is on the process of deliberation rather than its
outcome.
Some writers, including Gerald Dworkin and (indirectly) Harry Frank-
furt, have argued that personal autonomy must involve a particular kind of
preference structure as well as a particular kind of deliberation process.
Dworkin, for example, defines personal autonomy as “a second-order capac-
ity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires,
wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in
light of higher-order preferences and values,” where “higher-order” prefer-
ences “define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives.”11 Such
a hierarchical preference structure may already be implicit in Rawls’s theory,
as he distinguishes plans of life from lower-order desires.12
As noted by Raz, personal autonomy is associated with a number of vir-
tues, seen variously as conditions of its exercise or as constitutive elements.
John Christman mentions the conditions of competency (e.g., rationality)
and authenticity (reflective endorsement of one’s desires).13 Joel Feinberg
offers a more comprehensive list, including authenticity, self-creation, integ-
rity, and initiative.14 Various types of self-control (over actions, belief, will-
ing, etc.) are also relevant, as Alfred Mele points out, because akrasia makes
it difficult to devise and carry out plans of life.15 These diverse lists indicate
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the underlying complexity and ambiguity of the idea of personal autonomy;
it is a concept with many conceptions, as Dworkin aptly notes, and different
theorists will understand it in different and even incompatible ways.16
Theorists of personal autonomy appear to be in agreement about one of its
features, however: its distinctness from moral autonomy. Whether moral
autonomy is understood in its specifically Kantian sense or more generally as
the capacity for a sense of justice, these theorists believe that it neither
implies nor is implied by personal autonomy. David Johnston, for example,
argues that “a person could be morally autonomous without being in the habit
of subjecting her own values and projects to critical appraisal. Similarly . . . it
is possible to be personally autonomous without being morally autono-
mous,” as would be the case with a self-authoring, self-aware, and authentic
mass murderer; the pure proceduralism of personal autonomy does not
assure results consistent with the moral law or any other substantive stan-
dard.17 As we shall see, this disjuncture between personal and moral auton-
omy is the main obstacle to constructing a genuinely Kantian personal auton-
omy—though not an insurmountable one.
KANTIAN PRUDENCE AS PERSONAL AUTONOMY
Jeremy Waldron asks “whether there is anything approximating personal
autonomy in Kant’s account of happiness” and offers a three-page sketch of
an affirmative answer, but he ultimately concludes that the passages he cites
“do not add up to a theory of personal autonomy in the sense used by modern
liberals,” though “they point a little bit in that direction.”18 I will argue in this
section that the parallels between Kantian prudential reasoning and personal
autonomy are much stronger than Waldron believes and that this capacity for
prudence is even worthy of respect—at least according to several respected
secondary sources.
One task of Kantian prudential reasoning is to unite or integrate the incli-
nations into a single scheme of happiness. Kant says that in the idea of happi-
ness “all inclinations unite in one sum” and that the function of prudence is to
“unite all [one’s] purposes to [one’s] own enduring advantage.”19 His lan-
guage here sounds hedonistic, as if the function of prudence were merely to
maximize a sum of pleasures, but in later writings it is less so, as when he says
that inclinations “can be brought into a tolerable system” and that we must
“curb them, so that they will not wear each other out but will instead be har-
monized into a whole called happiness.”20 Here, inclinations are not united
under a single hedonistic metric but rather harmonized, systematized, and
curbed where necessary; the heterogeneity of inclinations is maintained, and
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prudential reasoning takes on more of an artistic than a mechanical quality.21
Rawls uses nearly identical language when he describes the construction of a
plan of life, one of personal autonomy’s primary tasks:
The aim of deliberation is to find that plan which best organizes our activities and influ-
ences the formation of our subsequent wants so that our aims and interests can be fruit-
fully combined into one scheme of conduct. Desires that tend to interfere with other ends,
or which undermine the capacity for other activities, are weeded out; whereas those that
are enjoyable in themselves and support other aims as well are encouraged.22
Thus, in both Kantian prudential reasoning and the modern literature of per-
sonal autonomy, the integration of inclinations through a plan of life requires
a judicious blend of balancing, pruning, and cultivating, a process closer to
gardening than to mechanics.23
The inclinations to be integrated by Kantian prudential reason are not
merely heterogeneous but also hierarchically related. Kant’s example of the
man suffering from gout who sacrifices the long-term happiness that comes
from good health to the temporary pleasures of drink illustrates this point: the
inclination to good health is, Kant here implies, more essential to happiness
than the inclination to drink, and the latter should give way to the former on
grounds of prudence.24 He notes on another occasion that:
We can find satisfaction in the mere exercise of our powers, in the consciousness of our
strength of soul in overcoming obstacles opposed to our plans, in cultivating our talents of
spirit, and so forth, and we correctly call these joys and delights more refined because
they are more under our control than others, do not wear out but rather strengthen feeling
for further enjoyment of them, and while they delight they at the same time cultivate.25
As we have seen, such a hierarchical preference structure, with higher- and
lower-order desires, is a key feature of personal autonomy as developed in the
writings of Dworkin and Frankfurt.
Kant emphasizes that the process of integrating our inclinations in the
pursuit of happiness is a task for empirical practical reason, which helps us
harmonize desires of different kinds and of different orders of precedence.
Reason cannot issue determinate principles for the pursuit of happiness,
however, but only prudential counsels, such as “regimen, frugality, courtesy,
reserve, and so forth, which experience teaches are most conducive to well-
being on the average.”26 The successful pursuit of happiness requires life
experience plus the judgment and discernment that can grow with it, so that
we may learn in time what makes us happy as individuals. The counsels of
prudence, Kant says, are “so tenuous that everyone must be allowed count-
less exceptions in order to adapt his choice of a way of life to his particular
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inclinations and his susceptibility to satisfaction and still, in the end, to
become prudent only from his own or others’ misfortunes.”27 Kantian pru-
dential reasoning thus combines the idiosyncratic self-authorship empha-
sized by Raz with the deliberative rationality stressed by Rawls.
As noted in the last section, personal autonomy is associated with a num-
ber of virtues, such as authenticity, integrity, and so on. Although Kant usu-
ally discusses these virtues in a moral context (e.g., self-awareness or self-
knowledge), they also show up in his analysis of prudence.28 Self-control, for
example, is mentioned as a quality of character that is “good for all sorts of
purposes [and] even seem[s] to constitute a part of the inner worth of a per-
son” but is not unconditionally good because it can support prudent but
immoral behavior.29 Self-control’s complementary vice, akrasia, appears to
be responsible for the failure of prudence in the gout case mentioned above.
Paul Guyer believes this case exemplifies the truth that happiness is “a ratio-
nal goal that must be represented as distinct from and authoritative over one’s
momentary inclinations”; self-control is precisely the virtue that can render
the authority of prudential reasoning efficacious.30
Most theorists of personal autonomy believe it to be, as Raz does, “an
essential ingredient of individual well-being,” and Kant similarly holds that
the happiness achieved through the exercise of prudence is a good in itself
(albeit not an unconditional one). Happiness, for example, is part of the high-
est good in Kant’s moral theory: virtue is the supreme good, but the complete
good requires happiness proportional to virtue as well, at least for sentient
beings such as ourselves.31 Moreover, in his later writings Kant argues that
our original predispositions to self-love, which have happiness as their
object, are predispositions to the good, and therefore any attempt to root them
out would “not only be futile but harmful and blameworthy as well.”32
Some theorists of personal autonomy have made even stronger claims in
its favor: Gerald Dworkin, for instance, argues that “moral respect is owed to
all because all have the capacity for defining themselves.”33 Kant would seem
unlikely to make similar claims in favor of prudential reasoning, as respect in
Kant is usually directed toward man as a moral agent, capable of acting con-
sistently with and out of respect for the moral law, rather than as a prudential
agent. Several commentators on Kant, however, maintain that there is a
Kantian argument for respecting man as a prudential agent. Henry Allison,
for example, argues that our freedom and rational agency are exemplified by
the pursuit of happiness as well as morality: all maxims, including maxims of
prudence and skill, are freely adopted (i.e., objects of choice or Willkür) and
also “subject to the objective criteria of reasonableness expressed in the
objective practical principles,” such as the principle expressed in the Ground-
work that “whoever wills the end also wills . . . the indispensably necessary
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means to it that are within his power.”34 As Christine Korsgaard points out,
Kant says that “the capacity to set an end for oneself—any end whatsoever
[moral or nonmoral]—is what characterizes humanity”; this claim, when
combined with the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-Itself (“so act that you
use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”), suggests that
even our capacity for prudential end-setting is worthy of respect.35 Finally,
Allen Wood argues that our self-conception and even sense of self-worth
derive in part from our capacity for prudence:
The difference between acting on technical imperatives and acting on prudential impera-
tives (or counsels of prudence) may be seen as a difference in the depth of the self-con-
ception that gives these practical principles their authority. What binds me to act on a
technical imperative is the conception of myself as a rational being who happens to have
set a certain end. What binds me to act on a counsel of prudence is something still deeper,
the conception of myself as a single self with a conception of its own good. My commit-
ment to an end I have set can be abandoned at my discretion, but my rational commitment
to prudence cannot be abandoned as if it were an arbitrary end.36
THE HETERONOMY OF KANTIAN PRUDENCE
The previous section provides compelling evidence, I believe, that pru-
dential reasoning is a Kantian personal autonomy, at least in the first sense of
the term: it is a conception of personal autonomy, recognizable as such by
personal-autonomy theorists, that is found in Kant’s writings. In order for it
to be Kantian in the second, deeper sense, however, Kant himself would need
to be able to recognize it as a species of autonomy; without such recognition,
the gap between personal and moral autonomy would remain unbridged, and
we would merely have identified two parallel but ultimately nonintersecting
accounts of autonomy in Kant’s practical philosophy. As I shall argue,
though, Kant would not characterize prudential reasoning as autonomous,
for two separate but closely related reasons. First, our desires are disorderly
and constantly shifting; consequently, our conception of our own happiness,
which tries to unite these desires into one coherent system, will be similarly
fluctuating and perhaps anomic. Second, even if prudence could successfully
systematize our desires, the source of these desires would still be outside the
self, in nature and in corrupt society; therefore, even the orderly fulfillment of
them would not be autonomous but rather heteronomous. Let us examine
these two objections in turn.
Kant consistently describes our inclinations, which are the motivational
elements of our plans of happiness, as inconstant and unpredictable. The
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cause of this variability, according to Kant, is that “all the elements that
belong to the concept of happiness are without exception empirical, that is,
they must be borrowed from experience”; we are therefore uncertain about
not only our current inclinations but also our future ones, which may be influ-
enced by both our own actions and the actions of others.37 Any plan of happi-
ness built on such uncertain foundations will itself be uncertain, which is why
Kant calls it a “fluctuating idea” and “not an ideal of reason but of imagina-
tion.”38 As the task of prudence is the construction and implementation of
such a plan of happiness, prudential reasoning will strive without success to
systematize what is intrinsically unsystematic, even anomic or lawless. A
necessary (but not sufficient) condition of autonomy is lawfulness; therefore,
prudential reasoning cannot be characterized as autonomous. Just as J. B.
Schneewind reminds us:
The natural disarray of the passions and desires is a given in Kant’s ethics. . . . The mate-
rial of our lives, the substantive happiness we pursue, comes from forces we can neither
create nor (as Kant eventually came to admit) eradicate. Moral agency brings a kind of
unity to our lives that prudential agency alone could never bring.39
Suppose for a moment, however, that Kant is wrong about this and that
prudential reasoning is capable of imposing a lawful plan of happiness on our
disorderly inclinations. One might even suppose (as Kant does for the sake of
argument) complete unanimity among finite rational beings regarding a plan
of happiness, with respect to both ends and means.40 Would this degree of
order be sufficient to make prudential reasoning autonomous? Hardly, for
autonomy requires not just lawfulness but a self-originating lawfulness, and
Kant held throughout his life that inclinations originate outside the self, so
that even the orderly fulfillment of them would be heteronomous.
According to Kant, all inclinations ultimately originate in nature: “happi-
ness contains all (and also not more than) that which nature provides us.”41
Those inclinations, imposed from without, are “always burdensome to a
rational being” and make him yearn for “a deliverance from the manifold dis-
satisfaction in which all those needs entangle him.”42 He experiences the pull
of nature in him as an alien, even a degrading force, a “commission from the
side of his sensibility which [he] cannot refuse”; without the “higher pur-
pose” offered by the idea of morality he would remain trapped by nature in
“mere animality.”43 At times like these, Kant’s practical philosophy veers
dangerously close to Manichaeism.44
As we saw in the last section, however, Kant appears to take a different
position in his later writings, where he speaks of our original predispositions
to self-love, which have happiness as their object, as predispositions to the
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good. The tone of the later writings is certainly different, but they do not in
fact differ substantively from the earlier writings. First, Kant continues to
maintain that these predispositions are implanted in us by nature and that we
are therefore not responsible for their existence.45 Second, though these pre-
dispositions may be toward the good, they are readily twisted into vices: the
predisposition to animality (i.e., a merely mechanical self-love, involving
drives for self-preservation, reproduction, and sociability) can lead to the
bestial vices of gluttony, lust, and lawlessness; the predisposition to human-
ity (i.e., a comparative and potentially competitive self-love, involving inter
alia a need to gain worth in the eyes of others, up to but not exceeding equal
worth, and a need to prevent others from gaining superiority over oneself)
can lead to the cultural vices of jealousy, rivalry, and even envy and
Schadenfreude.46 This is why Allen Wood speaks of the innocent (as opposed
to the good) will being in “a natural (if fragile) harmony with the good”: the
goodness of our original predispositions to self-love is a delicate one, a pri-
mal innocence that is easily corrupted.47
The heteronomous and even anomic qualities of prudential reasoning
explain why Kant himself neither takes it to exemplify our freedom and ratio-
nal agency nor makes it a source of our self-worth or a reason for why we
should be objects of respect. Rather, it is our moral agency that has these
qualities, as Kant emphasizes again and again in his writings—for example,
when he argues that “a rational being must always be regarded as at the same
time lawgiving, since otherwise it could not be thought as an end in itself.”48
Kant would almost certainly categorize prudence as a conditional good:
though it is perhaps conducive to good conduct in most cases, it can be put to
immoral uses (e.g., a prudent terrorist), in which case it becomes a bad rather
than a good. As Kant says, “the coolness of a scoundrel makes him not only
far more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than
we would have taken him to be without.”49 Respect, whether for ourselves or
others, must have an unconditional and permanent basis, one which only our
capacity for moral autonomy can provide.
KANTIAN PERSONAL AUTONOMY: A FRESH START
Given what I have said so far, a genuinely Kantian personal autonomy, one
that can bridge moral and personal autonomy, would need to meet two appar-
ently inconsistent criteria:
1. it would need to be ultimately motivated not by idiosyncratic and unstable inclinations
but rather by pure practical reason, that is, motivated by objective reasons, which are uni-
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versal in form, bind all finite rational beings, and provide a “unity to our lives”
(Schneewind) that is lacking under the mere rule of nature;
2. it would need to make substantial room for subjective reasons (i.e., reasons specific to
particular agents) in order to make self-creation or self-authorship a real possibility, for
autonomy on the Kantian model threatens to reduce “[self-]authorship . . . to a vanishing
point as it allows only one set of principles which people can rationally legislate and they
are the same for all” (Raz).50
Is it even possible for a single conception of personal autonomy to meet both
of these criteria, to be not only ultimately objective but also substantially sub-
jective? I shall argue in this section that Kant offers just such a conception
in his Tugendlehre, or “Doctrine of Virtue”—specifically, in the form of
certain imperfect duties of virtue to self (natural perfection) and others
(beneficence).
First, however, I want to place these duties in context by very briefly
reviewing part of Kant’s taxonomy of duties in his late moral philosophy.
(See Figure 1.51) Kant divides duties into duties of right and duties of virtue,
which are distinguished by (1) the presence of external enforcement with
respect to actions and omissions in the former and its absence in the latter and
by (2) the absence of a requirement to adopt particular ends in the former and
its presence in the latter.52 Thus, for example, the duty of noncoercion (pro-
scription of murder, etc.) may be enforced by threat of punishment but does
not require those who discharge it to have any particular end (e.g., the right of
human beings) in mind when doing so, whereas the duty of respect (proscrip-
tion of contempt, ridicule, etc.) may not be enforced by threat of punishment
but does require those who discharge it to have a particular end (namely, a
recognition of the dignity of other human beings) in mind when doing so.53
Duties of virtue are further subdivided into perfect and imperfect duties
(of virtue).54 Perfect duties of virtue require particular actions/omissions
because these are so closely related to the adoption of particular ends,
whereas imperfect duties of virtue allow latitude in the choice of actions/
omissions so long as the end is still adopted. For example, respect is a perfect
duty of virtue, as particular signs of disrespect (e.g., defamation) are to be
avoided as simply inconsistent with the end of respecting the dignity of oth-
ers; beneficence, on the other hand, is an imperfect duty of virtue, because it
requires no particular actions/omissions (e.g., giving $50 to Habitat for
Humanity) so long as the end of helping others is still adopted.55 Finally, the
imperfect duties of virtue are further subdivided into (imperfect) duties (of
virtue) to self and others. The imperfect duties of virtue include duties to per-
fect oneself (both naturally and morally) and to love others in a practical
manner (through beneficence, sympathy, and gratitude).
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Natural perfection of oneself involves the cultivation of one’s natural fac-
ulties and talents of body, mind, and spirit, both for its own sake and for the
sake of myriad possible purposes, moral ones especially.56 As noted above,
the capacity to set ends is what defines humanity; respect for humanity in our
own person (specified by the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-Itself) there-
fore entails the development of this capacity along myriad dimensions.57
Kant emphasizes, however, that we have great discretion with respect to both
which talents we should develop and how much we should develop them (the
extensive and intensive margins, respectively) and that our choice of occupa-
tion largely determines which set of skills we develop.58 Moral perfection of
oneself requires the cultivation of one’s moral disposition, with the ultimate
aim of purity, so that respect for the moral law is a sufficient incentive for dis-
charging duty—a purity that may not be attained in this life but only in the
next.59 Kant leaves little room for discretion here, though: he says that this
duty is “narrow and perfect with respect to its object” and that one must there-
fore “strive with all one’s might” for moral purity.60
Practical love of others is related to willing, not feeling, as feeling cannot
be commanded as a duty.61 What is to be willed here is benevolent conduct, as
specified in the duties of beneficence, sympathy, and gratitude. Like Kant, I
will focus on the first. Beneficence is the duty to promote the happiness of
others by making their (permitted) ends our ends as well and by then acting to
advance those ends.62 Kant says “there is still only a negative and not a posi-
tive agreement with humanity as an end in itself unless everyone also tries, as
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Duties of Right
(e.g., noncoercion) 
Duties of Virtue
Perfect Duties 
(e.g., respect) 
Imperfect Duties 
Duties to Self 
Natural Perfection 
Moral Perfection 
Duties to Others 
Beneficence 
Sympathy 
Gratitude 
Duties 
Figure 1: Partial Taxonomy of Duties in Kant’s Late Moral Philosophy
far as he can, to further the ends of others.”63 Respecting the rights of others,
in other words, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for respecting
their humanity: if the capacity to set ends defines humanity, then we must
help others to achieve their (permissible) ends in order to respect them fully.
As was the case with natural perfection, we have a great deal of discretion
regarding how and to what extent we discharge our duty of beneficence. As
Kant puts it, “the duty [of beneficence] has in it a latitude for doing more or
less, and no specific limits can be assigned to what should be done”; we may,
for example, refuse requests for help if we believe they will not promote the
happiness of the recipient or if they conflict with our “true needs.”64
I can now return to my original claim, namely, that Kant implicitly offers
us a conception of personal autonomy in his Doctrine of Virtue in the form of
two imperfect duties of virtue: natural perfection of oneself and beneficence
toward others. We can see how these two duties constitute a conception of
personal autonomy if we consider how they meet the two criteria for a
Kantian conception of personal autonomy enumerated above. First, they are
both ultimately motivated by objective reasons. As we have seen, the duties
of self-perfection and the practical love of others follow from a respect for
humanity as an end in itself, whether it lies in our own person or in the person
of others, and humanity is the highest objective end of pure practical reason.
These duties provide architectonic principles for a virtuous life that flow
from our own capacity for autonomy and thus help to correct the anomic and
heteronomous features of prudential reasoning.
Second, both duties allow subjective reasons to play a substantial role. By
leaving so much to discretion, these duties create a great deal of room for self-
creation or self-authorship. A virtuous Kantian agent has enormous freedom
to fashion his own plan of life—one reflecting his own idiosyncratic “tastes,
opinions, ideals, goals, values, and preferences” (Feinberg)—while at the
same time discharging his duties to perfect himself and advance the happi-
ness of others.65 For example, self-perfection can be achieved through any
number of different occupations, hobbies, and other personal projects that
will often be a central if not the central focus of agents’ plans of life. More
often than not, advancing the happiness of others plays a similarly large role,
whether it is achieved in intimate settings (e.g., through one’s support for
family, friends, and colleagues) or in more impersonal, institutionalized
ways (e.g., gifts of cash or labor to organized charities). By choosing among
these different means to (ultimate) objective ends, agents can fashion unique
and satisfying lives for themselves, authentic lives of their own making but
also lives having a moral point. In other words, the shape of such lives can be
responsive to subjective reasons (e.g., choosing one occupation over another
because of one’s tastes and/or natural abilities) without ceasing to be about
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objective ends; the pursuit of such ends validates or redeems supporting sub-
jective reasons, so to speak, despite their heteronomous nature. As Allen
Wood says, “if I am a decent person, I will choose to give my life meaning by
pursuing some set of ends that fall under the general description ‘my own
perfection’ and ‘the happiness of others.’ Where that is so, morality under-
writes our ground projects, regarding them as morally meritorious.”66
None of this is meant to deny, of course, that Kantian agents may adopt
merely subjective ends that are consistent with both right and the perfect
duties of virtue. An example might be a certain type of consumption activity:
although some kinds of consumption have a self-improving quality to them
(e.g., reading challenging novels), others will lack this quality and thus qual-
ify as merely subjective ends (e.g., reading the Beetle Bailey comic strip).67
Kantian duties of virtue are not “maximalist,” demanding that moral agents
sacrifice all their merely subjective ends in order to perfect themselves and
aid others. These concerns must play some role in the life of a virtuous agent,
of course, but he can limit them without blame for the sake of merely subjec-
tive ends, including especially his “true needs” (for food, clothing, shelter,
companionship, etc.).68
The conception of personal autonomy implicit in Kant’s Doctrine of Vir-
tue avoids a problem that is endemic to the personal-autonomy literature:
autonomy as it is conceived in this literature is consistent with unethical, even
criminal behavior, which leads one to question its independent value. As I
noted at the end of the last section, Kant considers prudence—the first of the
Kantian conceptions of personal autonomy we examined—to be a merely
conditional good: as Kant says, “the coolness of a scoundrel makes him not
only far more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes
than we would have taken him to be without.”69 The same point would seem
to apply to personal autonomy more generally, but the Kantian personal
autonomy that we explored in this section is immune to such criticisms. Far
from condoning immoral behavior, this version is itself a moral enterprise,
directing agents to advance the objective end of humanity in themselves and
others.
Such a solution appears to create a new problem, however. Autonomy has
typically meant a certain independence from constraint, so how then can a
meaningful conception of autonomy be constituted by the constraints of
moral duty? The answer to this question is that these constraints are them-
selves a product of self-legislation; autonomy is not inconsistent with con-
straints per se but rather with constraints imposed on an agent by someone
else. In the case of Kantian personal autonomy, this self-legislation has two
facets. First, the imperfect duties of self-perfection and beneficence are cre-
ations of our own pure practical reason: maxims inconsistent with these two
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duties cannot be universalized (as they lead to a contradiction in will) and
therefore violate the first formulation of the categorical imperative, which
itself follows from our autonomous will.70 Second, despite our discretion
with respect to how and to what degree we carry out these duties, we must
create plans of life that are at least minimally responsive to them, plans that
are more idiosyncratic and particularistic forms of self-legislation. This dual
self-legislation combines elements of moral and personal autonomy, respec-
tively, into a unified whole.
The genuinely Kantian personal autonomy just described indicates that
the sharp distinction between Kantian moral autonomy and contemporary
personal autonomy—a distinction made, as we have seen, by contemporary
Kantians and personal-autonomy theorists alike—is overdrawn. More gen-
erally, the argument of this section has revealed a potential connection
between what had previously been regarded as fundamentally different con-
ceptions of autonomy, suggesting that there may be other connections as well
and offering us the prospect of a unified theory of autonomy. Furthermore,
our search for conceptions of personal autonomy in Kant’s moral philosophy
has revealed in his work an unnoticed (or perhaps undernoticed) concern for
self-authorship, Raz’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding.71 What may
have seemed a hopelessly anachronistic enterprise at the start has proven
both philosophically and exegetically useful.
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL
APPLICATION: JOHN RAWLS
In addition to improving our understanding of Kant’s own moral theory
and the relationship among the various conceptions of autonomy, Kantian
personal autonomy provides an additional, much-needed line of defense
against criticisms of contemporary Kantian theories, especially that of John
Rawls. Two criticisms of Rawls’s theory are of particular interest here: the
first, which I shall call the “Discontinuity Criticism,” comes from inside the
liberal camp; the second, which I shall call the “Arbitrariness Criticism,”
comes from outside it. I shall describe each criticism in turn, showing how
Kantian personal autonomy provides Rawls with a powerful response to his
critics—though probably not one that the later Rawls could have employed,
as we shall see.
Jeremy Waldron states the Discontinuity Criticism succinctly when he
says that Rawls “has to explain why individuals are willing to subordinate
their pursuit of the good to principles of right, and how that subordination is
possible given the discontinuity between moral autonomy and the pursuit of
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an individual conception of the good,” a discontinuity that threatens to make
strictures of right seem “alien . . . from the personal point of view.”72 Consider
the religious fundamentalist, for example, who believes those outside the
church will suffer eternal hellfire and that physical force is therefore justified
to bring them into the fold.73 He may come to accept the arguments for liberty
of conscience, but perhaps only as an alien imposition bearing little relation
to his deeply held religious faith. This example presents the discontinuity in
its starkest form.
Rawls, of course, is perfectly aware of the possibility of such discontinu-
ity: it motivates his complex and at times obscure “congruence argument,”
which tries to show that “the disposition to take up and be guided by the
standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good.”74 This argument
knits together various claims defended throughout Theory, including the
propositions that a well-ordered society made possible by justice greatly con-
tributes to our pursuit of the good and that acting justly expresses our most
fundamental desire qua free and equal rational beings. Waldron believes that
the congruence argument is unsuccessful, a position that is taken by many
scholars and apparently by Rawls himself.75 Even those scholars who defend
the argument or some reconstruction of it (e.g., Samuel Freeman) recognize
its limitations and many critics.76
Without taking a position on the merits of the congruence argument
(whether as originally presented or as reconstructed by Freeman inter alia),
we can readily see how Kantian personal autonomy offers a different and per-
haps more compelling way to bridge the gap between justice and goodness.
Respect for humanity as an end in itself requires us to discharge both duties of
right and duties of virtue, and as we have seen, certain imperfect duties of vir-
tue to self and others constitute Kantian personal autonomy. Therefore, when
we incorporate objective ends (specifically, self-perfection and the happiness
of others) into our conceptions of the good and the plans of life that realize
them—as virtue requires us to do—we demonstrate the very same respect for
humanity that we show by fulfilling our duties of justice. In short, there need
be no sharp discontinuity between justice and goodness, between moral and
personal autonomy, if goodness and personal autonomy are interpreted in a
Kantian fashion. Of course, such a move may require us to adopt a critical
attitude toward certain existing conceptions of the good (e.g., religious fun-
damentalism), as Kantian morality is consistent with many different reli-
gious and ethical traditions but is not and indeed could not be neutral toward
all conceptions of the good.77 As we shall soon see, this feature of Kantian
personal autonomy makes it unlikely that Rawls could have accepted it fol-
lowing his so-called “political turn.”
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Unlike the Discontinuity Criticism, the Arbitrariness Criticism comes not
from within the liberal camp but rather from communitarian adversaries of
Rawls, most notably Michael Sandel. Sandel famously criticizes Rawls for
his conception of the moral agent. He argues, among other things, that the
“unencumbered and essentially dispossessed” self of Rawlsian theory has no
basis for choice in matters of goodness (as opposed to justice): if the “self is
prior to the ends which are affirmed by it,” as Rawls says, then “deliberation
about ends can only be an exercise in arbitrariness,” as there are no preexist-
ing materials (e.g., preferences, values, goals) upon which to base such delib-
eration.78 In other words, the priority of the self over its ends implies that pru-
dential reasoning must involve groundless choice or a kind of deliberative
bootstrapping.
The Arbitrariness Criticism has itself been roundly criticized, most nota-
bly by Will Kymlicka, who responds to Sandel by noting that the priority of
the self asserted by Rawls means only that our given ends can be criticized
and revised, not that we can practice groundless choice or ever envision our-
selves as fully “unencumbered.”79 Though some of Sandel’s claims here are
indeed quite questionable, the arbitrariness charge in particular is harder to
rebut because Rawls himself acknowledges this attribute of his theory of
deliberative rationality: he speaks of the “arbitrary features of plans of life”
as well as the “indeterminacy of the conception of the good.”80 Rawls consid-
ers such indeterminacy to be “relatively innocuous” because, given the prior-
ity of the right over the good, the potential arbitrariness of the good does not
effect the secure status of “men’s claims on one another.”81 Sandel’s concern
regarding this indeterminacy seems slightly different, however: if men’s
choices are bounded only by the (admittedly secure) principles of justice and
rational choice, the field of choice will remain dizzying large, leaving men
who live in a fluid, plural society susceptible to the disorientation and
normlessness of Durkheimian anomie.
Rawls might respond to this concern with an intellectual-division-of-
labor argument—to wit, that securing rights is the business of justice and pro-
viding purpose is the business of the various moral and religious doctrines of
the good present in any diverse society—but such a response would merely
strengthen the force of the Discontinuity Criticism. Kantian personal auton-
omy provides Rawls with a way of confronting Sandel’s concerns directly.
Rather than simply adding new constraints to those already provided by prin-
ciples of justice and rational choice, Kantian personal autonomy offers a set
of objective ends to help agents orient themselves both personally and mor-
ally when they construct their plans of life. Indeterminacy, of course, remains
an issue (e.g., one must still decide how and to what extent to perfect oneself
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and advance the happiness of others), but these objective ends, if adopted by
the conscientious agent, provide at least some positive guidance to augment
the mostly negative, prohibitive rules of right and prudence.82 In short,
Rawls’s best response to the Arbitrariness Criticism might be a more thor-
oughly Kantian liberalism rather than the retreat from Kantianism into
communitarianism suggested by Sandel.
Such a response would have been difficult for Rawls, however, after his
so-called “political turn”: he says in his late writings that the “full autonomy
of political life must be distinguished from the ethical values of autonomy
and individuality, which may apply to the whole of life, both social and indi-
vidual, as expressed by the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill”;
thus, it is highly unlikely that Rawls could have endorsed Kantian personal
autonomy at this stage given its inextricable connection to Kant’s compre-
hensive liberalism.83 Rawls’s “political turn” was motivated by his concerns
regarding the public justification and stability of justice as fairness: given the
fact of reasonable pluralism, liberal societies will assuredly be populated by
adherents of non-Kantian reasonable comprehensive doctrines who will be
unable to endorse a justification of political principles grounded on a Kantian
understanding of autonomy and whose commitment to those principles may
therefore prove unstable. His proposed solution to this problem is to offer a
justification of these principles that does not rely on the idiosyncratic
assumptions of any given reasonable comprehensive doctrine but rather on
the “fundamental ideas in a democratic political culture” that are shared by
all such doctrines.84 The later Rawls would therefore have regarded Kantian
personal autonomy as incompatible with political liberalism, as its strong
assumptions about autonomy, virtue, and objective ends cannot be publicly
justified, that is, cannot be part of an overlapping consensus of the diverse
reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a liberal society.
This evolution of Rawls’s theory apparently renders any discussion of his
potential adoption of Kantian personal autonomy moot: why should we care
whether Kantian personal autonomy would provide an additional line of
defense for a superseded theory? I say “apparently,” because political liberal-
ism itself has been subjected to searching criticism, and if Rawls’s “political
turn” turns out to be mistaken, then an interest in the structure of his earlier,
comprehensive liberalism might be justified.85 One concern about political
liberalism has been raised by John Tomasi, who argues that “political liberals
cannot hope to adopt a wholly new motivational base for their view and yet
have the content of justice remain exactly the same as before. . . .”86 More spe-
cifically, the weaker assumptions of political liberalism, which allow a diver-
sity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines to participate in an overlapping
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consensus, may simply yield weaker results in terms of the political princi-
ples that can be supported.
In a recent article, for example, I argue that the lexical priority of liberty
can be defended only with a robustly Kantian conception of the person, one
that would be difficult for other reasonable comprehensive doctrines to
accept.87 Briefly, Rawls’s best defense of the priority of liberty takes our
highest-order interest to be the preservation of our rationality (understood as
our capacity to form and revise a conception of the good and an associated
plan of life) and the preconditions of its exercise, especially the basic liber-
ties. As a facet of our autonomy, rationality takes absolute priority over our
other interests (such as material consumption), which is why the basic liber-
ties that support it take absolute priority over other social primary goods. The
strong conception of the person underlying these claims appears inconsistent
with certain reasonable comprehensive doctrines, which is presumably why
Rawls explicitly excludes the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and Sidg-
wick from his earliest versions of the overlapping consensus.88
Rawls’s defense of the difference principle in Theory relies upon similarly
strong assumptions about the structure of conceptions of the good, assump-
tions that may be in tension with many or most reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. In Section 26 of Theory, for example, Rawls points out that one of
the three conditions for the adoption of maximin is that “the person choosing
has a conception of the good such that he cares very little, if anything, for
what he might gain above the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of
by following the maximin rule”; he adds shortly thereafter that the difference
principle “guarantees a satisfactory minimum. There may be, on reflection,
little reason for trying to do better.”89 It is unclear why liberal utilitarians and
other partisans of non-Kantian but reasonable comprehensive doctrines
would endorse this kind of asceticism, though it would be consistent with (if
not endorsed by) a Kantian doctrine. If the priority of liberty and the differ-
ence principle are indeed what give justice as fairness its “force,” as Rawls
asserts in Theory, then the move from a comprehensive to a political liberal-
ism might seriously undermine the defense of its two most distinctive
elements.90
Thus, in order to argue more effectively for justice as fairness, Rawls (or
rather his followers) might need to return to Theory’s comprehensive Kantian
liberalism. If such a return is seriously entertained, then the question of
whether the earlier Rawls could have adopted Kantian personal autonomy as
a way of deflecting Waldron and Sandel’s criticisms becomes more germane.
He does in Theory leave open the possibility at least of constructing a
Rawlsian Doctrine of Virtue:
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Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian
idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, to a sys-
tem including principles for all the virtues and not only for justice. Now for the most part I
shall consider only principles of justice and others closely related to them; I make no
attempt to discuss the virtues in a systematic way. Obviously if justice as fairness suc-
ceeds reasonably well, a next step would be to study the more general view suggested by
the name “rightness as fairness.”91
Rawls later goes on to sketch the sort of principles that might apply to indi-
viduals, especially with regard to natural duties (e.g., mutual aid and mutual
respect) and supererogatory actions (e.g., beneficence), but his discussion
there is admittedly and intentionally incomplete.92
Were Rawls actually to have carried out such an extension of his theory, he
would likely have found much in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue congenial. Both
base their theories on a conception of man as a “free and equal rational
being,” and both seek to discover principles that “best manifest this freedom
in [human] community [and that] most fully reveal [our] independence from
natural contingencies and social accident.”93 A Rawlsian Doctrine of Virtue
grounded and motivated in this fashion would surely have placed an empha-
sis, as Kant’s did, on the systematic development of the human capacity to set
ends, not only because the exercise of this capacity is so likely to be ham-
pered (in ourselves as well as others) by the “natural contingencies and social
accidents” of which Rawls spoke but also because its development features
so strongly in his theory of justice. Such an extension of Rawls’s theory to a
complete ethical system would have put him in a better position to respond to
the kinds of criticisms leveled by Waldron and Sandel, but as we know he
chose to develop his theory in another direction entirely.
If Rawls’s theory were supplemented by something like Kantian personal
autonomy, would it then qualify as a variety of liberal perfectionism like the
theories of William Galston and Joseph Raz?94 On Rawls’s own understand-
ing of perfectionism, it would not. Rawls sees perfectionism as a teleological
theory that maximizes the good, understood in this context as “the realization
of human excellence in the various forms of culture.”95 He explicitly says that
“justice as fairness is not a maximizing theory” and that the human excel-
lences constituting moral personality (i.e., the capacities for a conception of
the good and for a sense of justice) need only meet a low “essential mini-
mum . . . ordinarily realized in due course.”96 Rawls’s theory would not be
maximizing even if it were supplemented by duties of self-perfection like
those found in Kantian personal autonomy: as we have seen, natural perfec-
tion of oneself is an imperfect duty, discretionary with respect to both which
talents are developed and how much they are developed.
Taylor / KANTIAN PERSONAL AUTONOMY 621
Rawls’s definition of perfectionism is arguably too narrow, however. One
indication of this is that the theories of self-identifying liberal perfectionists
such as Galston and Raz would probably fail to be perfectionist on Rawls’s
account: the radical value pluralism of their theories and the absence of clear
weighting or ranking rules make it difficult to categorize them as maximiz-
ing.97 If we understand perfectionism in a somewhat looser sense, however,
as concerning itself with the promotion if not the maximization of certain
human excellences, then his theory is plausibly thought of as perfectionist,
especially if it is supplemented by something like Kantian personal auton-
omy. As noted above, Rawls’s original theory recognizes the need to develop
(if only to a modest degree) the human capacities for rationality and reason-
ableness, and its commitment to the lexical priority of fair equality of oppor-
tunity arguably reveals a moderate perfectionism, as the function of such pri-
ority is to privilege the pursuit of virtuosity in the various positions and
offices of the basic structure.98 If a doctrine of virtue that included imperfect
duties of (natural) self-perfection were added to Rawls’s theory, its perfec-
tionism would be even more striking, at least by the looser definition of the
term.
CONCLUSION
I began the central part of my paper by asking whether Kantian prudence
might qualify as a conception of personal autonomy. I went on to discover a
series of striking similarities between the two—including a hierarchical inte-
gration of the inclinations, a combination of idiosyncratic self-authorship
with deliberative rationality, and a dependence on such ancillary virtues as
self-control—but finally concluded that it qualifies as a Kantian personal
autonomy only in the first, weaker sense of that term. It failed to qualify in the
second, deeper sense because Kant does not and in fact cannot view prudence
as a species of autonomy: the disorderliness and variability of our desires and
their exclusive origin in nature and in corrupt society imply that the pruden-
tial reason that attempts to govern them will at best be heteronomous and at
worst anomic. I then began anew by considering whether the elements of a
conception of personal autonomy could be found in Kant’s “Doctrine of Vir-
tue”—specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical
love of others. These duties indeed met the two criteria I specified for a
Kantian personal autonomy because they are responsive to the subjective rea-
sons of individual agents while still being directed toward the objective end
of humanity. I concluded by showing that Kantian personal autonomy, if
adopted by Rawls, could provide an additional line of defense against two
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criticisms of his theory of autonomous agency by Waldron and Sandel. By
giving Rawls a means to integrate personal and moral autonomy and to pro-
vide positive guidance to conscientious moral agents, Kantian personal
autonomy would in fact allow him to deflect these criticisms, but only at the
cost of developing his own Doctrine of Virtue, something that would be diffi-
cult after the “political turn” but quite attractive if a return to the comprehen-
sive Kantian liberalism of Theory were entertained.
Over the course of the essay I have emphasized the philosophical and
exegetical value of this comparative exercise, but it is valuable in other ways
as well. As James Schmidt has observed, critics of the Enlightenment com-
monly condemn it for “reducing society to a series of contracts between oth-
erwise isolated individuals,” a criticism also applied to contemporary liberal-
ism.99 As applied to Kant and many other Enlightenment figures (e.g., David
Hume and Adam Smith), the criticism is absurd. Some versions of contem-
porary liberalism, on the other hand, have made themselves vulnerable to
such a charge by either ignoring virtue or by focusing exclusively on its pro-
cedural political dimension (e.g., toleration, civility, reasonableness, etc.).100
Kantian personal autonomy offers one way (though certainly not the only
way) for practitioners of these versions of liberalism to reengage with matters
of virtue; it offers personal autonomy with a moral point, without abandon-
ing liberal principles. The cure to what ails contemporary liberalism, in short,
is not a disengagement from our Enlightenment heritage but rather a more
systematic engagement with it.
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